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This research looks at the impact that community property law has on 
cohabitation rates. The risk ingrained in community property states discourages 
individuals from marriage promoting cohabitation as an alternative that does not 
have the same ramifications of the law. By comparing community property law 
states with common law states using multiple models, the research investigates 
the correlation of cohabitation and community property law from several angles. 
Chapter 2 uses cross-sectional data from the Current Population Survey 
from 1977 to 2011 to view the impact that community property law has on 
cohabitation rates. The research uses a multinomial logit model to measure the 
likelihood to cohabit versus marry in the nine community property states and 
compares it to the rest of the US which utilizes a common law system to 
determine property ownership within marriage and beyond. In 1977 the impact 
was large, but it diminished over time until there was no difference between the 
cohabitation rates of the common law states and the community property states 
by 2006.  The study also applies Akerlof’s theory of reputation to show that as 
the impact that cohabitation has on reputation has lessened so has the difference 
caused by the community property law. 
Chapter 3 looks at changes in Wisconsin divorce law as a natural 





adopt community property law. The research uses a difference in difference 
approach to study the impact that the adoption had on the cohabitation rate 
within Wisconsin and compares it with the increase in the cohabitation rate of a 
group of similar states. The study finds Wisconsin had greater growth of the 
cohabitation rate than similar states (which did not adopt the same change in 
law). It concludes that the adoption of the law was followed by an increase in the 
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Several studies have looked at the impact that divorce law has on family 
formation and dissolution. However, none have touched directly on the impact 
that property law has on family formation, and only a few have mentioned it in 
passing (Gray, 1996, 1998). This research studies the effects of property law on 
household formation, more specifically the tendency towards cohabitation.  
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) were among the first to bring the 
family unit to the forefront of economic analysis. Becker et al. (1977) described 
household formation primarily as the selection of a spouse, assuming that if a 
couple were living together they were married (Brien, Lillard, & Stern, 2006). 
However, recently that assumption is increasingly inaccurate. Thirty percent of 
the participants in the NLS72 survey entered into a cohabitating relationship 
before or instead of marriage. Becker et al. (1977) outlined a utilitarian view of 
living arrangements. They first showed that by sharing living costs the overall 
expenditures would reduce and consumption would increase, increasing the 
aggregate household utility. Becker et al. (1977) showed that individuals would 





greater living together than it would be if they lived apart. Furthermore the 
couples would gain utility from an increase in time spent with their significant 
other. Becker (1974) also outlines a more complex utility curve that includes the 
level of utility of one’s partner: The husband gains utility from increasing the utility 
of the wife. Becker describes this tying of each other’s utility into one’s own as 
“caring” for one’s partner. Couples that practice caring are able to obtain a higher 
level of utility than would otherwise be possible. 
Starting in the late 1960s the landscape of family formation changed on 
multiple fronts. Prior to this transition society dictated that family formation 
followed a specific path. Individuals who strayed from that path suffered a loss of 
reputation. Similar to discrimination in Akerlof’s 1980 study of the labor market, 
the utility gained by a good reputation can lead to conformity to a societal norm 
regardless of the belief system of the individual. The appropriate path according 
to societal norms included first courtship, followed by marriage, sexual relations, 
the birth and rearing of children, and finally the marriage ending with the death of 
one or both of the spouses. Deviating from that norm would include divorce, 
cohabitation and children born out of wedlock. Deviation could result in the loss 
of an individual’s reputation, causing a drop in utility depending on the 
individual’s utility curve. In 1940 the divorce rate (number of divorces in a year 
per 1,000 married couples) was 9.2. By 1970 it had increased to 14.9, and by 
1974 it was 19.3 (Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977).  It peaked in 1979 at 22.8 
(Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). However, Stevenson and Wolfers indicate that 





before the spike. This return has been attributed to rise in both the cohabitation 
rate (Bumpass & Sweet, 1989; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007) as well as the 
average age at first marriage (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). Bumpass and Sweet 
indicate that cohabitation once faced disapproval because it flaunted sexual 
intimacy outside of marriage, but now that intimacy outside of marriage is 
common regardless of living arrangements, the impact on the cohabiters’ 
reputation has lessened over the years (Cigno, 2009).  
 
1.2 The Economic Analysis of Marriage 
Family formation research in economics started with Gary Becker in the 
two articles “A Theory of Marriage Part I” (Becker, 1973) and “A Theory of 
Marriage Part II” (Becker, 1974). Since these two papers and his book “A 
Treatise on the Family,” the study of the family within the economic framework 
has seen greater acceptance and the branch of family economics has been 
accepted into the mainstream. Since then many economists have looked at 
several aspects of the family including family formation and marriage markets 
(Chade & Ventura, 2002; Chiappori, Iyigun, & Weiss, 2009; Siow, 2008), fertility 
(Becker & Barro, 1988; Bonitsis & Geithman, 1987; Greenwood, Guner, & 
Knowles, 2003; Shields & Tracy, 1986), divorce (Becker et al., 1977; Brien et al., 
2006; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007), cohabitation (Brien et al., 2006; Bumpass & 
Sweet, 1989; Chevan, 1996; Cigno, 2009; Clayton & Voss, 1977; Glick & 
Spanier, 1980; Seltzer, 2000; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007), legislation (Forte, 





Weiss & Willis, 1993), and division of house hold labor among the spouses (Blau, 
Kahn, & Waldfogel, 2000; Sheets & Braver, 1996; Stevens, Kiger, & Riley, 2001). 
Becker (1973) outlined a framework where economies of scale would 
cause an increase in utility among married couples. Two individuals will marry or 
live together if and only if the utility of both is increased by doing so. They will 
remain together if and only if the perceived level of utility outside of the living 
arrangement is less than it is within the arrangement. The decision to start living 
together usually starts within the marriage market. Individuals gain information on 
the quality of the match through courtship until a point where the perceived utility 
of living together is greater than the current level of utility. Similar to the 
reservation wage in labor decisions, some individuals may have a reservation 
level of utility that they are waiting for in order to initiate marriage or cohabitation.  
 
1.3 Cohabitation 
Further research has distinguished between marriage and cohabitation. 
The utility of cohabitation compared with marriage can be diminished by social 
stigma and legal discrimination (Cigno, 2009). Cohabitation has been seen as an 
extension of courtship, a way to further filter out bad marital matches (Ridley, 
Peterman, & Avery, 1978). However, much of the recent research on 
cohabitation has shown that individuals who cohabitate prior to marriage are 
more likely to experience divorce than those who never cohabitate (Axinn & 
Thornton, 1992; Bennett, Blanc, & Bloom, 1988; Brien et al., 2006; Cigno, 2009; 





Wolfers, 2007; Teachman & Polonko, 1990). The debate over the impact of 
cohabitation on subsequent marital instability is not about whether it occurs but 
why it occurs. Authors such as Axinn and Thornton (1992) hypothesize that 
individuals who cohabitate are part of a subculture of individuals who are prone 
to marital instability, whereas others like Bennett et al. (1988) argue that the 
cohabiter learns a lack of commitment during the cohabitation period that may 
carry over into the marriage. 
Cohabitation is becoming an ever more popular practice. The stigma 
against individuals that are cohabiting is diminishing. Even with the acceptance 
of cohabitation into our society there are still benefits of marrying over cohabiting. 
Married individuals are able to pay fewer taxes as well as participate in the 
partner’s employer-based benefits. If individuals who cohabit are more likely to 
divorce and are unable to enjoy some of the benefits of marriage, then why do 
people cohabit? There must be some aspect of cohabitation that would cause the 
utility of cohabiting to be greater than both staying single and getting married. It 
could be simply that the longer marriage is pushed off the more likely a couple’s 
relationship inertia will carry them into cohabitation (Stanley, Rhoades, & 
Markman, 2006).  
 
1.4 Divorce 
The prospect of divorcing and the emotional, economic, and social cost 
that comes along with it may be another aspect pushing individuals towards 





divorce rates shot up to an unprecedented level. At the same time cohabitation 
levels have been steadily growing (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). The risk of an 
eventual divorce may push some to choose cohabitation over marriage.  
The face of divorce laws also changed in the 70s and 80s. All 50 states 
and the District of Columbia have adopted either no fault divorce laws, unilateral 
divorce laws or both (Drewianka, 2008; Gunter & Johnson, 1978; Stevenson & 
Wolfers, 2006). No fault divorce laws allow a couple to petition the courts for a 
divorce without any underlying cause. Prior to this law many states required 
some underlying reason to grant a divorce, including but not limited to abuse, 
neglect, infidelity, insanity, imprisonment, or alcoholism. However, two healthy, 
well balanced adults would not be allowed to divorce. To get around this 
requirement many came up with a fault that both would agree upon. No fault 
divorce laws shifted the bargaining power from the party that wants the divorce 
the least to the one that wants it the most (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006). 
However, the adoption of unilateral divorce law removed it all together. Under 
unilateral divorce law one spouse could file for divorce without the consent of the 
other. Without the requirement of getting a spouse to sign off on the divorce, 
bartering for that signature is no longer necessary.  These two laws together 
could have pushed more individuals towards cohabitation. Divorce can be a 
difficult thing to go through and the loss of control over that aspect of marriage 







1.5 Common Law 
When a divorce does occur, one aspect that involves quite a bit of negotiating 
and bargaining is the division of assets. Each state has adopted one of two 
different rules governing how the assets are divided. The first is common law 
division, where the name on the title gives that individual the rights over that 
property. While in the last 30 years many common law states have initiated 
practices of fair division, the court has a great deal of discretion in judging what is 
“fair.”  
 
1.6 Community Property Law 
The second type of law governing division of assets is community property 
law. This law creates a community or partnership when the marriage is 
established. Each spouse is an equal partner in all assets acquired during the 
marriage, and in the case of divorce all marital or community assets are divided 
equally. The marital assets will include retirement accounts, any income, and 
businesses, along with other financial and physical property. In community 
property states these assets would be split evenly with one spouse often buying 
the other out of homes and businesses, retirement accounts equalized and all 
marital assets split evenly regardless of the origination or effort put into their 
obtainment. Originally the law was used as a set of rules for inheritance but it 
currently plays a large role in divorce. 
Furthermore, community property law also gives creditors access to the 





go after the income of the spouse of the indebted even if the debt precedes the 
marriage. This law further diminishes the control or the semblance of control over 
an individual’s contribution to the community’s property (Carroll 2007).  
Community property law was originally established in France and Spain. It 
migrated to the new world and was practiced in areas with greater Spanish and 
French influence. Influential settlers within 6 of the south western states including 
California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and Louisiana continued the 
practice and put it in the initial laws of the individual state. Later, Washington and 
Idaho adopted the law upon statehood and finally Wisconsin adopted the law as 
a way to equalize gender outcomes within the new unilateral divorce laws; the 
first full year of practice without court challenges was 1988 (Seed, 1995).  
 
1.7 Research Overview 
This research is intended as a way to better understand how laws can 
influence individual behavior. Many have looked at the impact that the divorce 
law reform had on the divorce rate, family formation and many other subjects 
(Drewianka, 2008; Gray, 1996, 1998; Gunter & Johnson, 1978; Stevenson & 
Wolfers, 2006); however, most studies show that a lack of a significant impact on 
the divorce rates. Does the lack of control over an individual’s contribution to the 
community in community property states influence some who would not 
otherwise cohabit to consider cohabiting? Primarily, I will be looking at the 
cohabitation rates in the community property states and I will compare them with 





The next chapter will review the impact of community property law on the 
cohabitation rate using a multinomial logit model to compare cohabitation and 
other relationship statuses to marriage, looking for the difference between 
common law states and the community property states. It will use the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) over the years between 1977 and 2011.  
The subsequent chapter will evaluate the increase in the cohabitation 
rates for Wisconsin and compare them with the increase in a sample of similar 
states. Using the CPS in a difference in difference model, I will evaluate the 
impact that the 1988 law change had on Wisconsin’s cohabitation rates.  
 
1.8 Data 
The CPS is used due to its large data set in multiple years including 
households with the geographical location data necessary to compare the 
different regimes. The CPS is a cross sectional data set rather than a longitudinal 
data set and therefore can only identify the number of individuals who are 
currently in a given relationship status. Since 1995, the CPS has included 
“nonmarried partner” as a response to the “relationship with the head of 
household” question. This allowed more accurate tracking of cohabiters. 
However, prior to 1995, cohabiting households had to be identified by reference 
to various characteristics, e.g., the number of adult nonrelatives of the opposite 
sex residing in the household. Many researchers have used POSSLQ (Partners 





POSSLQ, I will use a modified version for both chapters. These definitional 








COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW 
 





Over the last 30 years cohabitation has been growing in acceptance and 
practice. Researchers such as Bumpass and Sweet (1989) and Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2007) have attributed the drop in marriages to the rise in cohabitation 
and the increased average age at first marriage. Bumpass and Sweet outline the 
growing acceptance for sexual relations outside the bonds of marriage as a 
predominant factor in the social acceptance of cohabiting partners.  
Cohabitation has been seen as a trial period for marriage where only the 
good matches evolve into marriage, however many studies have shown that 
those that do cohabit prior to marriage are more likely to divorce (Axinn & 
Thornton, 1992; Bennett et al., 1988; Lillard et al., 1995). Others have shown 
cohabitation to have no effect on marital stability (Teachman & Polonko, 1990). 
Still others have found that premarital cohabitation decreases the likelihood of 
dissolution of subsequent marriages (Svarer, 2004). Most believe cohabitation 





 Many factors may play a role in promoting cohabitation. Becker (1974) 
indicated that the choice to marry would only be made if the utility of being 
married is greater than the utility of staying single. To take it one step further, the 
choice between cohabitation and marriage for a couple would involve comparing 
the utility of cohabitation with the utility of marriage. Marriage as an institution has 
several advantages over cohabitation including tax treatment of the couple, 
access to employment related family benefits as well as other social programs 
geared towards the married population (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). 
Cohabitation on the other hand is not as difficult to sever. Divorce requires at the 
very least legal paper work, at the most attorneys and court appearances. Ending 
cohabitation only requires a moving truck. 
In addition to these influences on the relative costs and benefits of 
cohabitation and marriage, the form of family law may also have an influence. In 
particular, community property law and common law exert different influences on 
the likelihood of cohabitation. 
In this paper I investigate the effects that the two different legal regimes 
have on cohabitation. I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to estimate 
cross sectional and cross sectional time series models of marital status including 
cohabitation. My results indicate that the community property law has had an 
impact in the past. However, the effects have been diminishing over the years to 
the point where there is no difference in the cohabitation versus marriage rate 
between the two regimes. The next section will go over community property law 





at cohabitation as a social structure and how that structure plays a role in the 
couple’s decision to cohabit or marry. The description of the model will come 
next, followed by the results and conclusion.  
 
2.2 Community Property Law 
Community property law states that each individual in a marriage is an 
equal partner in the ownership of all of the assets of the family. Once you marry 
in a community property state, any new assets from that time forward become 
property of the community, defined by husband and wife, and as soon as the 
community dissolves through death or divorce the community assets are split in 
two equal portions. In the case of a death, the surviving spouse retains their half 
of the assets, and the other half goes to the beneficiaries of the deceased 
spouse (typically the surviving spouse). In the case of divorce, the assets are 
split equally between the two parties. Often, family homes must be sold, business 
owners must buy their ex-spouse out of the business, and 401ks and IRAs are 
split. Weitzman (1985) asserts that a wife could end up with as little as a third of 
the assets in a common law state, while in community property states they end 
up with exactly half. Weitzman does not back this assertion up with data, and the 
findings she did get from a specific data set (that unilateral and no fault divorce 
laws had a largely negative impact on the wives’ post divorce economic welfare) 
were refuted by Peterson (1996). Peterson was unable to achieve the same 
results as Weitzman using the same data, calling into question the validity of 





Outside Weitzman’s assertions no others have empirically compared the 
difference in asset division between community property states and common law 
states.  They have simply referred to community property law as more favorable 
to the wives than common law (Gray, 1998). The risk of losing half of the 
belongings of the community with no thought given to the source of the income 
that acquired the assets or the amount of effort either spouse put into the 
accumulation of these assets could deter some from entering into a marital 
union.  
On top of the risk of equal division in community property states, some 
individuals may have the preference to not share ownership with their spouse. 
They would prefer to keep their name and only their name on assets. Some 
couples choose to have separate bank accounts, separate assets, and prefer to 
do as they will with the income they personally receive. However, community 
property states define all assets acquired within marriage as jointly owned by 
both spouses and community property law would decrease the utility of these 
individuals.1  
Gray (1996), whose primary focus was on bargaining power of the wife in 
divorce, states that a wife divorcing under common law is only entitled to the 
assets she brought into the marriage and any assets put in her name during the 
marriage. She is not entitled to the income of her spouse (including any 
retirement) or any other assets acquired during marriage unless they are also put 
in her name, while wives divorcing in community property states are entitled to 
half of all of the assets acquired during marriage.  
                                                          
1





However, equal division of assets upon dissolution and preferences for 
separate assets are not the only deterrents to marrying in a community property 
state. According to Carroll (2007), once an individual is married they become 
liable for their spouse’s premarital debt, and their spouse’s premarital creditors 
can garnish that individuals wages or empty that individuals bank account to 
recover that debt.  
These risks could encourage individuals to choose to cohabit in order to 
avoid the ramifications of the law. Individuals could use cohabitation as a way to 
avoid the debtors until the debt is no longer an issue.  
In both community property states and common law states, the division of 
property is determined by the couple or the courts. However, the rules 
determining how the property is split are considerably different. Most common 
law states have laws stating the division of assets in the case of marital 
dissolution should be fair; however, community property states have made it 
mandatory to have the value of the assets that each party receives be exactly 
half of the total value. The division of assets in community property states is 
equal but not necessarily fair. What the courts or couples in common law states 
decide is fair is not necessarily equal. The court battles in common law states are 
to determine the fairness of the division. The court battles in community property 
states are to determine what is considered a marital asset and what is not 








Starting in the mid 1960s and continuing on to 1981 the divorce rate 
increased drastically, shooting up from around 10 per 1000 married individuals in 
1970 to 22.8 per 1000 married individuals in 1979 (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). 
At the same time states were passing no fault and unilateral divorce laws 
(Stevenson, 2006). These laws made it easier for the courts to grant a divorce as 
well as removing joint control over divorce, replacing it with unilateral control. At 
any given time a single spouse can decide without the consent of the other that 
the marriage is over, and they no longer have to have cause or fault for the 
breakdown of the marriage.  
The new laws removed individual control, reducing the ability of the 
individual to control the risk of divorce and increasing the inherent risk in 
community property law once married. 
 
2.4 Cohabitation as a Social Custom 
Cohabitation does not carry the social standing or benefits of marriage. 
Within marriage you are often able to benefit from tax breaks, employment 
sponsored insurance and other social and government benefits. It also carries a 
social stigma and couples who cohabit have been viewed negatively in the past. 
Many practices or beliefs that are carried from generation to generation 
can be described as a code of behavior. A code of behavior can motivate 





The code of behavior for relationships in society has been courtship, 
followed by marriage, then sexual relations, baring and raising children and 
finally dissolution of the marriage by death. Those who deviated from the code by 
divorcing, cohabiting or having sexual relations outside of marriage diminished 
their reputation.  
Aklerlof (1980) described a system where utility is a function of 
consumption, reputation and tastes and preferences. He demonstrates how a 
code of behavior may drive individuals towards market behavior that does not 
trade on the equilibrium, leaving a market that has not cleared of all beneficial 
trades. In his model individuals who do not obey the code lose their reputation 
and the loss of reputation causes a decrease in utility of that individual. He uses 
the model to demonstrate the longevity of racial and gender discrimination. He 
shows that, if an individual deviates from the code and suffers a loss of 
reputation reducing the utility more than the increase of utility from the benefits of 
the deviation, then the code will perpetuate. However, as more and more 
individuals deviate from the code, the loss of reputation from deviation 
decreases, reducing the effect of the code. Akerlof also shows that if there are 
more people who believe in the code than there are people who obey the code 
(there are people who believe in the code but do not obey it) then over time the 
number of believers will diminish. 
Following Akerlof’s model an individual’s utility is based on four arguments 
and their personal tastes: 





G is a vector of individual consumption of goods and services 
R is the individual’s reputation among the community 
A is a dummy variable showing the obedience to the code  
   is a dummy variable showing the belief or nonbelief in the code 
  is the individual’s tastes and preferences 
Akerlof also shows that the individual’s reputation function consists of, 
among other things, A (the individual’s obedience to the code) and µ (which is 
the percentage of the population that believes in the code, so that the larger the 
percentage the larger effect noncompliance has on the reputation). 
                  (2) 
The application of this model to the decision to cohabit is straightforward. 
When cohabitation involves loss of reputation, this reduction in utility may 
encourage more individuals to marry, rather than cohabit. However, as deviation 
from the code becomes more common, the utility costs from deviating 
(cohabiting) diminish, moving marginal individuals out of marriage and into 
cohabitation. 
This research takes the implied step that consumption is also a function of 
individual obedience to the code as individual consumption can change based on 
the obedience to the code. This will have the biggest impact on individuals who 
cohabit in order to avoid aggressive creditors from having access to both 
partners’ incomes.  





It also assumes that compliance is a function of tastes and preferences 
and belief in the code.  
                  (4) 
As long as the increase in utility from the increase in consumption or the 
fulfillment of preferences as a result of noncompliance with the code is less than 
the decrease in utility from the loss of reputation as a result of that deviation, the 
individual will remain obedient to the code. However, when the utility from the 
increased consumption is greater than the disutility from the loss of reputation 
from deviation then that same individual will choose to break tradition and deviate 
from the code.  
The cost of compliance to the marital code in a community property state 
is greater than or equal to the cost of compliance in a common property state 
depending on individual circumstances. The same individual who would choose 
to marry in a common law state may choose to cohabit in a community property 
state as long as the increased cost of compliance is greater than the loss from 
the decrease in reputation.  
However consumption is not the only factor of the utility function that may 
hold couples back in a community property state. Some couples may prefer to 
maintain separate assets and do not wish to share their increase even with their 
partner. This preference for individual ownership, while it may or may not 
increase consumption, does impact the choice to comply with the code. Couples 





instead of marry and have the law give equal partnership to all assets to each 
spouse.  
As long as the following holds a couple would cohabit in community 
property states but not in common law states: 
                  (5) 
                (6) 
   represents the utility of an individual if they chose to cohabit; all else 
equal, the utility of cohabiting in a common law state would be the same as the 
utility of cohabiting in a community property state.      is the utility of a not 
cohabiting and getting married in a community property state and      is the 
utility if they chose not to cohabit and get married in a common law state.  
Using Akerlof’s utility function and the additional cost of following the code 
in community property states, I hypothesize that community property law has 
caused some to avoid or postpone the effects of the law by deviating from the 
code and cohabiting with their partner instead of marrying them. I will test the 
hypothesis by measuring the likelihood to cohabit as opposed to marry in 
community property states compared with common law states. 
 
2.5 Data  
The US census added cohabitation on their 1990 survey. Much of the 
research on cohabitation has drawn on data from the National Survey of Families 
and Households (NSFH) that was developed and administered by the University 





al., 2010) conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The US Census recorded a 3.5% cohabitation rate among adults in 
1990 and a 5% cohabitation rate in 2000. The CPS started allowing respondents 
to mark nonmarried partner as a choice in the question “how are you related to 
the head of household?” in 1995. The CPS shows that the cohabitation rate 
among adults rose from 2.9% in 1995 to 4.7% in 2005 (Stevenson & Wolfers, 
2007). 
Each of the data sets has its advantages and draw backs. The NSFH is a 
data set of 13,000 individuals with an oversample of cohabiters. The initial 
sample in 1987-88 had extensive interviews covering relationship, parental 
characteristics, and education history, along with other demographic and 
economic information. For questions about cohabiters and their attitudes towards 
relationships it is very rich. In the subsequent surveys in 1992-1994 and 2001- 
2003 they reinterviewed as many of the same individuals as they could, inquiring 
about the changes between the interview waves. However, this survey does not 
have participants in New Mexico and Nevada, two of the nine community 
property states. These two missing states could introduce a bias that would not 
be found in a data set that includes all 50 states. The National Survey of Families 
and Households is the most used due to the availability of individual relationship 
histories. This allows for event history analysis, survivor analysis as well as 
counting not only those who are currently cohabiting but also those who have 





While survivor analysis and history analysis are powerful tools in research, 
the best model for comparing the various possible relationship statuses and their 
correlation with other variables is the multinomial logit model. 
The data set used for this study is the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
March Demographic Supplement. The CPS was chosen because its cross 
sectional format allows for the use of the multinomial logit model allowing the 
comparison of cohabitation rates (and other relationship statuses rates) with 
marital rates and measurement of the difference in these comparisons between 
the two regimes, common law and community property. Furthermore the year 
after year format of the CPS allows for a look into the long term change in the 
various statuses. Finally assuming there is no difference in the average duration 
of cohabiting relationships between the two regimes then there would be no bias 
from using a cross sectional data set over a longitudinal data set. However the 
CPS has a few drawbacks: the largest is that it only captures a single point in 
time. There is no way to tell who may have cohabited prior to marriage or is 
currently single living alone after breaking up a cohabiting relationship. 
Another drawback of the CPS is that the first year it captured cohabitation 
was in 1995. Prior to this inclusion the accepted estimation of cohabitation is 
known as POSSLQ (Partners of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters). This 
counted all households of 2, the head of household and a nonrelative of the 
opposite sex, age 15 or higher. Casper and Cohen (2000) came up with an 
adjusted POSLLQ that along with the existing POSLLQ included larger 





of the nonmarried head of household, over the age of 15, living in the house. For 
this research I wanted to capture all potential cohabiters, even families with 
children of either partner over the age of 15. In order to do so I made the 
following assumptions to identify cohabiters: 
 They had to be a nonrelative adult in the household 
 They had to be the opposite sex from the head of the household 
 And no other individual living in the household who meets the previous 
two conditions can be closer to the age of the head of household 
The benefit of the CPS data set is that the assumed cohabiting variable 
could be tested against the actual responses for the years between 1995 and 
2011. The results were 99% correct, with a 0.87% type 1 error (identifying 
someone as a cohabiter who was not) and 0.18% type 2 error (not identifying a 
cohabiter as a cohabiter). With 99% accuracy, for the purpose of this paper the 
variable is assumed to be accurate for the years from 1977 to 2011 (this 
imputation, rather than directly recorded cohabitation status, is used for the years 




The cohabitation variable was then used along with the marital status 
variable from the CPS to construct a new marital status variable. The six states 





 Single never married, which includes individuals who are not cohabiting 
and have never married 
 Cohabiting never married 
 Married, which includes all individuals who are married (it does not 
differentiate between those who are in their first or subsequent marriage).  
 Separated 
 Divorced single (those that are divorced who have not remarried and do 
not cohabit) 
 Divorced cohabiting 
The sample size for 2010 is 140,752 individuals. 25.22% lived in 
community property states. Of those in community property states 46.58% were 
single never married, 3.04% were cohabiting never married, 41.34% were 
married, 1.94% were separated, 5.61% were divorced living alone, and 1.48% 
were divorced cohabiting. In common law states 45.41% were single never 
married, 3.12% were cohabiting never married, 42.21% were married, 1.67% 
were separated, 5.97% were divorced living alone and 1.63% were divorced 
cohabiting (see Table 2.1). 
The total sample size is 3,967,885 spread out over the years between 
1977 and 2011. 23.87% of them lived in a community property state. This 
includes Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, 








The model used to evaluate community property law and cohabitation was 
a multinomial logit model. The multinomial logit model2 is used when the 
dependent variable has no natural order. The following formula is the most basic 
of multinomial logit models that is used for this research. 
                  (8) 
where     is the propensity for individual i to be in state k=0,…,m where never 
married single is k=0, and never married cohabitating, married, separated, 
divorced single, and divorced cohabiting are k=1,..,5 respectively. Variable    is 
the residency status of individual i in a community property state, where x=1 if 
individual i currently resides in a community property state and x=0 if otherwise. 
         is the parameter of interest. 
In order to evaluate the impact that community property law has on 
cohabitation, this model was run on the CPS data set for 2010. Returning a odds 
ratio of 0.994 and a probability of 0.8340 the conclusion was to accept the null 
hypothesis that community property law had no impact on cohabitation over 
marriage (see the first column of Table 2.2).  
                                                          
 
2
 The original model included a fixed effects piece. This part of the model was dropped due to the 
colinearity of the community property variable and the fixed effects variables. The traditional way of 
getting around the colinearity is to run the regression without one of the variables causing colinearity. 
However, doing this gave the two states that were removed (one community property state and one 
common law state) a larger influence on the outcome. For example, when equation 1 was run including a 
dummy variable for each of the 51 states including DC (to obtain fixed effects) except for Nevada and 
Montana, which were removed to eliminate colinearity, for 2010 the resulting likelihood ratio was 1.668, 
indicating a 66.8% greater likelihood of cohabitation over marrying in community property states 
compared with common law states. Running the same model with Idaho and Montana removed; the 
resulting likelihood variable was 0.589, or a 41.1% lower likelihood of cohabitation in community property 
states. The lack of consistency from the fixed effects model and the resulting denial of the null when it 





In order to check the consistency of those results over the last 34 years 
the model was run again using a larger CPS data set including all the data from 
the years between 1977 and 2011. However the results of the second regression 
contradicted those of the first. According to the results from the large multiyear 
CPS data set, the likelihood of individuals to cohabit rather than marry was 
21.4% larger in community property states versus common law states (returning 
a likelihood ratio of 1.214 with a probability of 0.0000 as seen in the 2nd column of 
Table 2.2), allowing for the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
In order to account for the discrepancy between the two results another 
model was run that included a time series component (t=1 for year1977) as 
follows. 
                               (9) 
The additional parameter    represented the trend of the change in k 
compared with marriage for common law states.     indicates the starting point 
or the 1977 projected difference in k between community property states and 
common law states. This study concentrates on k=cohabitation and          is 
the projected difference in cohabitation compared with marriage between 
community property states and common law states at time=1 or year=1977. 
         is the projected yearly change in cohabitation compared with marriage for 
common law states. The third parameter           was constructed to explain the 
discrepancy between the 2010 results and the results from the multiyear data 





compared with marriage between community property states and noncommunity 
property states. 
The results indicated that individuals in community property states started 
out as nearly 50% more likely than their counterparts in common law states to 
cohabit compared to marry (with a likelihood ratio (LR) of 1.499, p < .0013). 
However since the initial start the overall likelihood of choosing cohabitation over 
marriage for the common law states has been increasing by 5.70% (LR of 1.0570 
and P of 0.000) per year and the difference in the likelihood to cohabit compared 
with marry between community property states and noncommunity property 
states has been decreasing by 1.2% per year (LR of 0.988 and P of 0.000). The 
decreasing trend is what was behind the difference between having no significant 
impact in 2010 and having a large significant impact for the entire 34-year data 
set. 
A regression similar to the one run for 2010 was run for each of the 34 
years as a way to test if period trends in the effect of state law are linear. The 
trend line for         (from equation 8), as displayed on Figure 2.1, shows that the 
downward change in difference in cohabitation between community property 
states and common law states is similar to the result from the time series 
regression. 
As a way to account for any spuriousness between community property 
law and the cohabitation rates, multiple demographic variables were introduced 
into the model as control variables. These variables include age, race, education, 
income (both individual and state median) and presence of own children in the 
                                                          
3





household. In an attempt to isolate the impact that different generations, or 
different positions in the lifecycle, have and their attitude towards cohabitation, 
age was divided into multiple dummy variables, one for each decade cohort (20-
29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, +70). The omitted variable for age was all adults 
younger than 20. This showed a much smaller impact from the other variables on 
single never married due to a higher percentage of individuals in that age range 
being single never married than in any other age range. In similar fashion the 
race variable was separated into three categories, White, Black, and other. The 
omitted variable for race was all races other than Black and White. Education 
was also coded using various dummy variables representing each level of 
education available including less then high school diploma, high school diploma, 
some college, bachelor’s, master’s, and doctorate. The omitted variable in 
education was individuals who had not obtained a high school diploma. Personal 
income was introduced as a way to control for any income effect on the 
cohabitation rate, and the state median income was introduced as a way to 
reduce the effect of individual state economic factors on the cohabitation rate. 
Following general practices, the natural log of the personal income and state 
median income was used. Finally, presence of own children in the household 
was used to take into account children as a motive to cohabitate or not 
cohabitate. The following equation was used to add these additional controls. 
                                         (10) 





and    .     is a vector of coefficients representing each of the control variables 
and      is a vector of those control variables.  
 Nested models were used to measure the impact that each of these 
control variables had, starting with the basic model as described above in 
equation 2 in column (A) of Table 2.2, followed by the addition of age and race in 
column (B), then expanding the model with education (C), then again with the 
natural log of personal income and state median income (D) and then again with 
the presence of own children dummy (E). 
 
2.8 Results 
Without the additional controls (column (A) From Table 2.2) cohabitation 
compared with marriage in common law states is shown to increase by 5.7% 
each year and the difference between common law states and community 
property states decreased by 1.2% each year starting at a 50.0% difference at 
year 0 (1977). With the addition of the controls the increase of cohabitation over 
marriage in common law states ranged between 2% in column (D) and 7.4% in 
column (B) year over year and the difference in cohabitation over marriage in 
community property states over common law states decreased between 1.1% 
per year in column (B) and .9% per year in column (D) starting at 40.4% in 1977. 
According to the results on Table 2.3 community property law not only has 
an effect on cohabitation, but it is also associated with between 9.7% and 21% 
greater likelihood of an individual being separated. It is associated with between 





58.0% to 65.6% greater likelihood to be divorced cohabiting. The increase in 
likelihood of being divorced single or divorced cohabiting could be due to the 
propensity of individuals to cohabitate at a greater rate in community property 
states. Or it could be due to a drop in desire to jump back into marriage after a 
divorce in a community property state(remarriage would decrease the total 
number of individuals who show up as divorced single and/or divorced 
cohabiting). However, the difference in the rate between community property 
states and common law states is decreasing over time for both divorced single 
and divorced cohabiting.  
Single cohabiting and divorced cohabiting could arguably be combined in 
order to get a better grasp on the increase in the overall difference in the 
cohabitation rate between the two regimes. These two separate variables could 
be creating an irrelevant alternative bias. Irrelevant alternative biases exist in 
multinomial logit models when two states are similar enough that they could be 
considered in the same state but are evaluated in separate states. For example 
in a study looking at travel choices with the following statuses car, red bus, blue 
bus, subway, individuals who choose to ride the bus would not necessarily 
differentiate between the red bus and the blue bus they could be considered 
perfect substitutes.. Running a multinomial logit regression that included both the 
red bus and the blue bus separately reduces the bus coefficient creating a bias. 
In this study never married cohabiting and divorced cohabiting could be argued 
to be similar to the red bus and the blue bus in the example. Hausman designed 





perfect or close to perfect substitutes and can be combined to get a more 
accurate representation of reality. However, the Hausman test showed that the 
two are not perfect substitutes (χ2=1670) validating the use of the two 
relationship statuses separately. This result confirms that one would not choose 
between cohabiting as a single and cohabiting as a divorced individual as you 
would between a red and blue bus and the inclusion of the two separate statuses 
does not change the coefficients for the other statuses. 
This shows that while deviation from the societal relationship code in 
general was greater in community property states, the difference between the 
two regimes diminished over time as the impact on the reputation of the deviant 
lessened. 
The effect of community property law is greatest for the incidence of 
“divorced-cohabiting” status. Those that have been through a divorce in a 
community property state know firsthand the impact of the law on division of 
property. The strength of the coefficient for divorced cohabiting shows that those 
that know the impact are more likely to choose cohabitation over marriage, by 
7% (1.603/1.499= 1.069) relative to those who have never been married. 
 
2.9 Ages 25 to 39 
The above results are showing the entire adult population. Another look at 
household formation behavior can be had by looking at the age group that is 
more likely to be starting to form their first household. The subsample of 





making decisions that are closer to permanent than those of younger and older 
cohorts. To further refine the analysis, I analyze only those who are either single 
never married, cohabiting never married, or married.  
The initial difference between the cohabitation rates of the two regimes is 
even larger than in the previous results. Community property states start out with 
a 54% higher cohabitation rate than their common law counterparts. The results 
also confirm the convergence of the cohabitation rates between the two regimes. 
Over the 3 decades from 1977 to 2011 the cohabitation rates of the two types of 
states has been converging by roughly 1.2% per year by this age group.  
Column (A) in Table 2.4 (Table 2.5 for full results) contains the results of 
the model without any control variables. Column (B) shows those same 
coefficients with one control variable representing the portion of the group whose 
ages fall between the ages of 25 and 29, with the base group being those who 
are in their thirties. Column (C) is the same model as column (B) with the addition 
of two dummy variables, White and Black, each representing the individual’s 
primary race. The base group is all other races. Column (D) contains all previous 
variables along with four other dummy variables representing the highest level of 
education completed: high school, some college, bachelor’s, and graduate, with 
the base group being those who did not finish high school. Finally (E) includes all 







Based on the above results we can reject the null hypothesis and accept 
the hypothesis that the existence of the community property law increased the 
likelihood of cohabitation compared with marriage, at least in the years between 
1977 and 2006. However, the likelihood to cohabit compared to marry in the two 
regimes slowly converged to the point where there is no longer a difference in 
cohabitation versus marriage between community property states and common 
law states. 
Bumpass and Sweet (1989) said: 
Unmarried couples living together once faced strong social disapproval, in 
no small part because their living arrangements flaunted their sexual 
intimacy. That issue has become largely irrelevant now that sexual 
relationships are common regardless of living arrangements. (p. 616)  
 
As the decrease in utility from the loss of reputation due to cohabiting 
diminished, the impact that community property law had on cohabitation 
disappeared. 
In Akerlof’s model of social custom, the disutility of deviating from a norm 
declines as the share of the population honoring the norm diminishes. In the 
1970s the rise in divorce could have started this process (this paper does not 
verify this correlation); the large number who deviated from the marital code by 
divorcing could have diminished the belief in the marital code for the next 
generation, who continued to deviate from the code by cohabiting. Deviation from 
the code no longer affects an individual’s reputation, or at least affects their 
reputation less than the utility gained by deviating in a community property state 





As the belief in the traditional marital code diminished so did the impact 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3 Multinomial Logit Model Full Results 
 
0.970 1.499 1.097 1.339 1.603
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 1.010 1.057 1.002 1.025 1.051
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.002 0.988 1.001 0.990 0.984




















Table 2.3 (Continued) 
  
0.880 1.355 1.124 1.380 1.580
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 1.026 1.074 1.002 1.023 1.051
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.004 0.989 1.004 0.990 0.984
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
20s 0.075 0.551 0.678 1.758 4.205
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
30s 0.012 0.110 0.531 2.397 5.182
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
40s 0.006 0.036 0.477 3.025 4.735
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
50s 0.005 0.017 0.400 3.163 3.795
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60s 0.005 0.009 0.306 2.770 2.151
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
70+ 0.006 0.007 0.233 2.163 0.992
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.945)
White 0.708 0.864 0.854 1.164 1.230
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 2.225 2.110 4.978 2.460 1.545























Table 2.3 (Continued) 
 
0.867 1.351 1.164 1.368 1.584
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 1.022 1.073 1.014 1.022 1.051
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.005 0.989 1.001 0.991 0.984
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000)
20s 0.069 0.569 0.801 1.775 4.625
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
30s 0.011 0.115 0.659 2.504 6.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
40s 0.006 0.037 0.581 3.163 5.504
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
50s 0.005 0.018 0.468 3.314 4.382
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60s 0.004 0.010 0.337 2.896 2.414
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
70+ 0.006 0.008 0.244 2.261 1.087
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.494)
White 0.710 0.851 0.823 1.137 1.171
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 2.286 2.060 4.413 2.362 1.391
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school 0.897 1.379 2.213 1.402 2.555
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some 
College 1.140 1.189 1.912 1.597 2.191
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bachelor's 0.974 1.160 1.105 1.028 1.115






















Table 2.3 (Continued) 
  
0.927 1.404 1.219 1.374 1.656
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 1.029 1.073 1.018 1.016 1.047
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.004 0.989 1.000 0.991 0.983
(0.000) (0.000) (0.920) (0.000) (0.000)
20s 0.083 0.464 0.909 1.871 4.119
(0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000)
30s 0.014 0.089 0.792 2.651 5.351
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
40s 0.007 0.027 0.696 3.284 4.672
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
50s 0.006 0.012 0.552 3.419 3.754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60s 0.006 0.008 0.423 3.305 2.454
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
70+ 0.008 0.010 0.337 2.817 1.460
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
White 0.746 0.853 0.875 1.182 1.203
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 2.019 1.846 4.045 2.192 1.316
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school 1.239 1.174 0.794 1.162 1.247
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some 
College 1.495 1.024 0.694 1.293 1.044
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Bachelor's 1.543 1.020 0.438 0.847 0.541
(0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.802 0.946 0.852 0.979 0.983

























Table 2.3 (Continued)     
  
0.9345 1.3811 1.225367 1.2686 1.6036
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 0.9924 1.0204 1.00298 1.008 1.0132
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
1.0056 0.9911 1.000202 0.9947 0.9846
(0.000) (0.000) (0.820) (0.000) (0.000)
20s 0.0732 0.4202 0.81448 1.6328 3.8945
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
30s 0.0122 0.082 0.714527 2.3757 5.0671
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
40s 0.0061 0.0276 0.629963 3.0349 4.5209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
50s 0.0045 0.0167 0.493487 3.1962 3.6644
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60s 0.0044 0.0158 0.372264 3.1027 2.3847
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
70+ 0.0061 0.0274 0.302037 2.6701 1.4253
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037)
White 0.7679 0.8873 0.892008 1.1685 1.229
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 2.3237 2.0705 4.04319 2.223 1.3851
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school 1.2147 1.1382 0.800177 1.1954 1.2625
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some 
College 1.4457 0.9794 0.689779 1.3208 1.0441
(0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Bachelor's 1.5043 0.9546 0.432866 0.8671 0.5421
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.8026 0.931 0.856136 0.9789 0.9712
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.3569 3.0743 1.328556 0.974 1.7804





























Table 2.3 (Continued)     
  
0.9632 1.4351 1.224723 1.2571 1.5983
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Survey Year 1.0091 1.0358 1.007069 1.011 1.0202
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1.0048 0.9899 1.000391 0.9951 0.9849
(0.000) (0.000) (0.662) (0.000) (0.000)
20s 0.1375 0.7473 1.079011 2.2159 6.2053
(0.000) (0.000) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000)
30s 0.0448 0.2611 1.243645 4.2943 12.885
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
40s 0.0193 0.0768 1.048475 5.2695 10.399
(0.000) (0.000) (0.360) (0.000) (0.000)
50s 0.0064 0.0221 0.579183 3.7956 4.555
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
60s 0.0041 0.0141 0.347745 2.8735 2.1137
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
70+ 0.005 0.0216 0.258885 2.2681 1.1358
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.453)
White 0.7913 0.9272 0.876759 1.1346 1.2209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Black 3.2265 2.7634 4.315372 2.3804 1.5935
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High school 1.0519 1.0022 0.758154 1.13 1.1504
(0.000) (0.842) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Some 
College 1.1791 0.822 0.652519 1.255 0.9648
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Bachelor's 1.0141 0.664 0.391176 0.7942 0.4609
(0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.7729 0.9151 0.85198 0.9759 0.9609
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.1882 2.8921 1.31442 0.9829 1.8006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.263) (0.000)
0.0357 0.0646 0.325311 0.2982 0.1295
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.5 Multinomial Logit Model for Ages 25 to 39 Full Results 
  
Variables
1.5477 1.0210 1.5320 1.0097 1.5482 1.0354
(0.0274) (0.0099) (0.0272) (0.0099) (0.0275) (0.0103)
1.0603 1.0267 1.0640 1.0317 1.0637 1.0297
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002)
0.9832 0.9982 0.9830 0.9978 0.9836 0.9991
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0005)
2.3061 2.9760 2.3166 3.0103
























Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. Time is measured in years where 1977=1. 














Table 2.5 (continued) 
Variables
1.5440 1.0324 1.5206 1.0174 1.6372 1.0920
(0.0275) (0.0103) (0.0330) (0.0136) (0.0377) (0.0173)
1.0627 1.0264 1.0138 0.9868 1.0376 1.0142
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009)
0.9832 1.0002 0.9862 1.0039 0.9822 0.9998
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007)
2.2885 3.0362 2.4010 3.1987 1.4711 1.7718
(0.0167) (0.0140) (0.0192) (0.0171) (0.0128) (0.0115)
0.9595 0.6604 0.9914 0.6981 1.1289 0.8005
(0.0142) (0.0060) (0.0165) (0.0073) (0.0202) (0.0102)
1.6435 2.3655 1.6218 2.2197 2.5412 3.8433
(0.0298) (0.0253) (0.0331) (0.0280) (0.0560) (0.0611)
1.1895 1.1652 1.1943 1.2191 1.1144 1.1200
(0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0146) (0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0120)
0.9987 1.1336 0.9945 1.2337 0.8568 1.0255
(0.0104) (0.0075) (0.0116) (0.0097) (0.0107) (0.0097)
0.8172 1.4381 0.8304 1.6250 0.5049 0.8972
(0.0095) (0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0132) (0.0070) (0.0087)
0.6924 1.4214 0.6741 1.5981 0.3906 0.8241
(0.0121) (0.0136) (0.0128) (0.0175) (0.0078) (0.0106)
0.9675 0.9042 0.9169 0.8342
(0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0027)
State Mean 2.5848 2.3549 1.9751 1.7019
Income (0.0685) (0.0411) (0.0562) (0.0358)
Presence of 0.0706 0.0329





































Numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors. Time is measured in years where 1977=1. 







COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND COHABITATION 
 





Between the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s, divorce rates doubled and 
continued to climb until they peaked in 1979 at 22.8 divorces per 1,000 married 
couples (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). At the same time divorce laws changed 
drastically. In the 1970s and 80s, states across the US adopted unilateral divorce 
law along with no fault divorce laws (Parkman, 1992).  
Unilateral divorce law allowed either spouse to file for divorce without the 
other’s consent. No fault divorce laws allowed divorces without the presence of 
fault or reason other than that a divorce was desired. These two laws reduced 
the bargaining power of the individual who did not want the divorce.  
In 1979 as a response to the growing trend in divorce and the drastic 
changes in divorce laws, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws created a committee to collaborate and propose a Uniform Marital 
Property Act (UMPA) (Cantwell, 1985). UMPA proposed that each spouse in a 





debt. However UMPA left the division of assets upon dissolution of marriage up 
to the legislative body that adopted it. 
Wisconsin was the only state to adopt a version of UMPA. However 
Wisconsin took the proposed marital partnership in everything and extended it 
through dissolution. They effectively adopted community property law along with 
the guidelines put forth by UMPA (Forte, 1996) , as such Wisconsin is the only 
state to go permanently from being a common law state to being a community 
property state. 
 
3.2 Community Property Law 
Community property law gives both spouses an equal vested interest in 
the community property. Thus, other than gifts, inheritance, or bequests, all 
property gained while married either by the husband or wife is jointly the property 
of the couple and each spouse is equally vested in it with one half interest. 
According to Hancock (1948), the rights of the wife are greater in community 
property law compared with common law, in that she has an equal defined right 
to the property instead of just an expected right to it. 
Community property law carries a few implications that may reduce the 
drive to enter into a matrimonial contract. First, the idea that all increase during 
marriage will be equally owned by both spouses regardless of the original 
source, and in the case of dissolution will be equally split between the two 
spouses, may cause an individual who is contemplating marriage to hesitate and 





intentionally chosen as a response to these concerns, it may arise “naturally” as 
a function of the delay of marriage (Manning & Smock, 2005).  
The other effect of community property law is that as soon as a couple 
marries the debt of both spouses becomes community debt. The creditors of one 
spouse can go after the income and assets of the other spouse in order to satisfy 
the debt (Carroll, 2007). This increased liability could motivate some couples to 
choose cohabitation over marriage in order to protect an income source from 
aggressive creditors.   
One other potential drawback of community property law comes from 
tastes and preferences. Some couples will have preference to maintain individual 
ownership of income and assets, giving each person in the marriage control over 
what they bring into the marriage. Community property law would lower the utility 
of these individuals, and, depending on their belief system, they may see 
cohabitation as an equal institution with a greater amount of individual control 
and choose cohabitation due to the higher level of utility.  
Those that cohabit can avoid or postpone the implications of the law for as 
long as they do not enter into a marital contract. My hypothesis is that the 
existence of the community property law increases the rate of cohabitation 
among adults who have never married.  
 
3.3 Experiment  
Wisconsin is unique among the community property states; all of the other 





Nevada, Texas, Louisiana, and New Mexico had many prominent citizens that 
were practicing the law and felt that any property acquired during marriage 
belongs equally to both husband and wife. When their state constitution was 
established community property law was made official. Other states like 
Washington and Idaho adopted the law upon inception (Seed, 1995). However 
Wisconsin adopted the law in the late 1980s. 
Wisconsin’s late adoption provides a unique opportunity to view the impact 
that community property law has on the cohabitation rate. By viewing the change 
in the percentage of adults in cohabiting relationships from before the adoption of 
the community property law to after and comparing it with the change in similar 
states over the same time period we can test the hypothesis that community 
property law does have an impact on cohabitation.  
It could be argued that it was the Wisconsin culture that was the source of 
the change in the cohabitation rate and the change in the law simultaneously. 
However, by looking at the change in Wisconsin over time we can draw a 
stronger conclusion of the impact of the law by holding culture constant. 
The change in Wisconsin’s marital property law creates a “natural 
experiment” that allows us to more closely examine causal relationships between 
the law and cohabitation behavior.  Natural experiments like this one have been 
used by many economists and other social scientists to evaluate public policy. 
Card and Krueger (1994) used a minimum wage change in New Jersey to view 
the impact on employment in the fast food industry. Acemoglu et al. (2004) used 





have on economic development, by comparing the economic growth of North and 
South Korea and later comparing the success of European colonies. Natural 
experiments provide an ideal way to look at the effectiveness of public policy and 
any unintended side effects. The adoption of community property law by 
Wisconsin provides an opportunity to see what impact community property law 
has on multiple fronts including cohabitation.  
In order to evaluate this natural experiment, Wisconsin was compared with 
other states. The first comparison was made with states in the Midwest region. 
These included Iowa, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska and 
Kentucky. The second comparison was made with states that had similar 
demographics prior to the change. These demographics included racial 
composition, age mix, income levels, and similar rates of cohabitation and 
marriage.  In order to find a sufficient number of comparable states to use in the 
sample, the demography of each common law state was compared with 
Wisconsin. The states were ranked for each of the above demographic 
categories and 10 states, the 5 states that ranked above and the 5 states that 
ranked below Wisconsin in each category, were flagged. The 7 states that were 
flagged the most were used as the comparison states. These included Colorado, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Georgia, Wyoming, Massachusetts and Kansas.  
 
3.4 Data 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) and the National Survey of Families 





on cohabitation. They both have captured cohabitation as a response variable. 
The Current Population Survey is run by the Census Bureau and surveys 
approximately 50,000 households monthly in a cross sectional survey. The 
National Survey of Families and Households is a longitudinal data set that initially 
surveyed 13,007 individuals in 9,637 households in 1987.  
Each data set has shortcomings. The National Survey of Families and 
Households does not contain sufficient information for each individual year after 
1988 (the year Wisconsin adopted the law). It does have subsequent surveys of 
the original respondents in 1993. It also neglects to include data on generations 
entering into adulthood after 1988 unless their parents were part of the initial 
sample. The NSFH also has an oversampling of cohabiting couples that does not 
allow for finding a percentage of the overall population that is cohabiting. While 
the oversampling would give us good insight into the lives of cohabiting 
individuals the limitation of years and population makes the CPS an ideal choice 
for the research. 
 
3.5 Variables 
However, the shortcoming of the CPS is that prior to 1995 it did not 
distinguish between roommate and cohabiter, and prior to 1988 all nonrelative 
individuals were in one classification, with no distinction between cohabiter, 
roommate, foster child, boarder or other nonrelative.  In 1988, codes for 
partner/roommate, foster child and other nonrelative were added. Finally in 1995 





partner, housemate/roommate, roomer/boarder/lodger, foster child and other 
nonrelative. To identify cohabitation in a consistent way, I classify a household as 
containing cohabiters if   
 There was a nonrelative adult in the household 
 That individual was the opposite sex from the head of the household 
 And no other individual living in the household who meets the previous 
two conditions was closer to the age of the head of household 
Following these assumptions a modified POSSLQ (Casper & Cohen, 2000) 
variable was constructed. The assumed cohabiter variable was then compared 
with the unmarried partner response in the CPS between the years of 1995 and 
2011. The variable was 98.95% accurate with a 0.87% type 1 error and a 0.18% 
type 2 error. These errors may be causing a bias in the results but in that there is 
currently no known way of more accurately capturing the cohabitation rate from 
the CPS prior to 1995 the study will assume the cohabitation variable to be 
accurate. The cohabitation variable does not differentiate between divorced 
cohabiters and never married cohabiters; it captures all cohabiters as one 
group.4 To avoid comparing individuals who are cohabiting with other individuals 
who are cohabiting and to capture the impact the law has on the choice to 
cohabit, the study treats all cohabiting adults the same without differentiating 
between single never married cohabiters and divorced cohabiters. 
                                                          
4
 Chapter 2 separates the cohabiters into two different categories, those that have never been married 
and those who are divorced. The multinomial logit model allows for this distinction. However, the 
difference in difference model in this chapter with cohabitation as the dependant variable works better if 





The other variables that were taken into account were age, race, 
education and household income. Observations were split into cohorts of age by 
decade with a dummy variable for each decade. Likewise, race was split into 
three dummy variables, White, Black and Other. Admittedly, the ”Other“ race 
variable is overly simple, but for these purposes it is assumed that splitting race 
into three categories will sufficiently remove any bias caused by a larger 
concentration of one race in one state over another. The CPS shows that 4.51% 
of Whites are currently in a cohabiting relationship compared with 5.62% of 
Blacks (see Table 3.1). 
Education was created as multiple dummy variables for each level of 
education starting with less than high school diploma, high school diploma or 
GED, some college, bachelor’s, and graduate level degree. The CPS shows that 
6.5% of adults who ended their education with their high school diploma are 
currently cohabiting compared with 3% of individuals with graduate degrees (see 
Table 3.1).  
Finally average family income was included in each state.  6.5% of the 
households who have a family income of less than half the average household 
income are lead by a cohabiting couple (see Table 3.2). Each group (defined by 
group 1 <1/2 the average household income (AHI), ½ AHI<group 2<AHI, AHI< 
group 3<1.5 AHI, group 4>1.5 AHI) above the poorest have roughly half the 
percentage of cohabiters that the previous quartile does (group 1: 6.5%, group 
2:3.5%, group 3:1.5% and group 4: .8%), the poorer the individual the higher the 





order to reduce the effect that some states have a lower average family income 
than others and may have a higher number of cohabiters due to the greater 
number of poor. 
Once the variables were defined an aggregate variable was created for 
each state for each year from 1977 to 1997. The aggregates represent the 
percentage of the total adult population that each dummy variable represented. 
Average Family income was the only variable not created from dummy variables 
and the natural log of the average family income was used as the aggregate 
variable. With 20 entries for each state, n is 160 (see Table 3.3).  
 
3.6 Model 
Wisconsin’s adoption of the community property law creates a natural 
experiment that can be exploited by using a difference in difference approach 
(Wooldridge, 2006). I used a difference in difference regression framework to the 
change in the cohabitation rate in Wisconsin from before 1988 to after 1988, with 
the change in the cohabitation rate in the comparable states.  
Each DD regression pools the data from prior to 1988 in two pools, 
Wisconsin and the comparison states, and does the same for the post-1988 
period. The regression takes the following form: 
                                 (11) 
Y is the cohabitation rate variable; i indexes the individual state and t 
indexes the year either pre or post 1988. 88 is a dummy variable equal to one for 





captures the initial  cohabitation rate for the seven comparison states prior to the 
law change.    reflects the change in the cohabitation rate for all comparison 
states from before the adoption of the law to after.    reflects the difference 
between the cohabitation rate for Wisconsin and the cohabitation rate for the 
comparison states prior to the law’s implementation. The cohabitation rate in 
Wisconsin was slightly higher than the other Midwest states but roughly equal to 
the other comparison states before the law was established.  
The coefficient of interest    is on the double interaction of Wis x 88 and 
measures the difference between the increase in Wisconsin’s cohabitation from 
before to after 1988 and the increase in the cohabitation rate of the comparison 
state. It tests the hypothesis that the cohabitation rate increased more in 




Running the regression on the seven Midwestern states and Wisconsin for 
the years between 1977 and 1997 (n=160, eight states with a record for each of 
the 20 years) resulted in the average cohabitation rate (  ) for the seven 
Midwestern states to be 2.05%, and Wisconsin’s average was 0.56% (  ) above 
the other states. Wisconsin starting out at a higher rate may show that its 
population was already prone to cohabitation. However the second group of 
states, the states whose demography more closely matches that of Wisconsin, 





from before the adoption of the law to after, the Midwestern states increased by 
2.18% (  ) and Wisconsin increased by 1.11% (  ) more. Wisconsin increased 
by nearly 50% more than the Midwestern states, doubling the lead it had on the 
other states. Wisconsin went from 2.61% (     ) to 5.90% (           ) 
an increase of 126% ((5.90%-2.61%)/2.61%). The other Midwestern states went 
from 2.05% to 4.23% (     ) an increase of 106% ((4.23%-2.01%)/2.05%) a full 
20% less than Wisconsin. These results allow us to reject the null hypothesis and 
accept the hypothesis that the adoption of the community property law had a 
positive impact on the cohabitation rate. 
The second comparison was run over the same years from 1977 to 1997 
on Wisconsin and the demographically similar states (Colorado, Georgia, 
Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska and Wyoming). The similar states 
started out with a 2.59% average cohabitation rate and Wisconsin was 0.13% 
(  ) higher. However the initial difference between Wisconsin and the other 
states (  ) was not statistically significant with a p-value of .742 and a t-stat of 
.33. Wisconsin and the other states started out at virtually the same cohabitation 
rate. The comparison states then increased from before 1988 to after by 1.90% 
(  ) and Wisconsin increased by an additional 1.27%. Both Wisconsin and the 
comparison group started out around 2.60%, the comparison group increased to 
4.50% after 1988, and Wisconsin increased to about 5.77%. The comparison 
states increased their cohabitation rate by 73%. Wisconsin increased by 22%, 





The previous chapter showed that the difference in the cohabitation rates 
between community property states and other states decreased over time, 
disappearing altogether in the last few years. This narrowing of the distribution of 
cohabitation rates might work against our finding an impact of the Wisconsin law.  
In order to lessen the impact of this convergence (and potentially identify impacts 
of the change in law for an earlier period), I ran the regression once more on the 
demographically similar states and Wisconsin using 15 years instead of 20. The 
regression was run for the years from 1980 to 1995 (n=120, 8 states with an 
entry for each of the 16 years). The comparison states started out with an 
average cohabitation rate of 2.96% and Wisconsin was not statistically different 
(   was 0.32% with a t-stat of .63 and a p-value of .531). The comparison states 
then increased by 1.15% and Wisconsin increased by an additional 1.44%. The 
comparison states went from 2.96% to 4.11% and Wisconsin went from 2.96% to 
5.55% (see Table 3.5).  
However, other things could be contributing to the cohabitation rate. The 
younger generation could be more accepting of cohabitation, while the older 
generation could favor the tradition of only living with someone you are married 
to. In the CPS 8.57% of individuals in their twenties are cohabiting with their 
partner compared to 1.96% of individuals in their sixties. For this reason age 
groups were added to the regression to produce the results in column (B) of 
Table 3.5. The baseline group in the “age” variable was individuals that have 





least prone to cohabitation, the most likely to be married and the least likely to be 
single never having married.  
Next, racial diversification could create bias if racial composition varies 
across states and if one race was more prone to cohabitation than another. Race 
was included in three categories, Whites, Blacks, and other. Other was used as 
the baseline variable of the three in that it represented the smallest portion of the 
population. “Other” lies somewhere between the White population and the Black 
population in nearly every marital status classification. Column (C) contains the 
results for the regression including both the age groups and race.  
Another factor that could be affecting the cohabitation rate is the level of 
education. If cohabitation varies by education level and if education level varies 
across states, or if the change in education level varied across states, this may 
affect our measurement. The baseline variable for education is the population 
who never finished high school. They are somewhere in the middle of the pack 
for each of the five marital status classifications. They are more likely to be 
married, less likely to be single never married and less likely to be cohabiting 
than both those that finished high school and those that attended college but 
never finished.  
  Column (D) contains the education levels along with everything that was 
in column (C). Finally, a change in the average family income levels over the 
same time period could influence the cohabitation rate, and if those changes 
were more prevalent in Wisconsin the hypothesis could falsely be accepted or 





hypothesis. Column (E) included the natural log of the average personal income 
level in each state along with everything in column (D).  
Once all of the control variables are entered the results still indicate the 
hypothesized results. Wisconsin starts out with a 0.43% greater cohabitation rate 
than the Midwestern states (however the difference is not statistically significant 
with a p-value of 0.122 and a t-stat of 1.56) and ends up with an increase of 
1.02% (p-value of 0.015 and t-stat of 2.45) more than the control states 
increased for the years between 1977 and 1997. For the demographically similar 
states Wisconsin’s cohabitation rate started out with a 0.28% greater (the 
difference is not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.382 and a t-stat of 
0.88). Wisconsin then increased by 1.44% (p-value of 0.001and a t-stat of 3.25) 
more than the control states increased. When the two groups were compared 
over 15 years Wisconsin started with an average cohabitation rate for the years 
between 1980 and 1987 that was 0.33% more than the average cohabitation rate 
for the Midwest states (however it was not statistically significant with a p-value 
of 0.312 and a t-stat of 1.02). Wisconsin then increased by 1.49% (p-value of 
.002 and t-stat of 3.14) more than the midwestern states for the years between 
1988 and 1995.  
In comparison with the demographically similar states over the same 15 
years, Wisconsin started out with a 0.7% (again not statistically significant with a 
p-value of 0.09 and a t-stat of 1.71) higher cohabitation rate. Wisconsin then 
increased by 1.66% (p-value of 0.005 and t-stat of 2.9) more than the 





However, all of these results were not free of heteroskedasticity. They 
were each run a second time using a heteroskedastic robust regression. The 
resulting estimates stayed the same, however the standard error and resulting 
significance variables were changed. Each table reflects the significance of the 
estimates in the robust regression. The most notable difference in significance is 
the variable of interest. In nearly every regression the coefficient representing the 
difference in the increase dropped from being statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level in the normal regression results to being statistically significant 
at the 90% confidence level in the robust regression results for the models 
without control variables. The results from the models with control variables hold 
up at the 95% confidence level.  
Table 3.6 contains the full results of each of the regressions run 
comparing Wisconsin and the Midwestern states, spanning 20 years from 1977 
to 1997. Table 3.7 contains those same results over 15 years from 1980 to 1995. 
Table 3.8 contains the regressions comparing Wisconsin with the 
demographically similar states for the same 20 years as above. Finally Table 3.9 
contains the results for that same comparison over the 15 years mentioned 
above. It is interesting to note that age, race education and income levels all 
have a larger impact on cohabitation than the adoption of the community property 







The Wisconsin experiment successfully shows an impact of the 
community property law on cohabitation in Wisconsin. The adoption of the 
community property law in Wisconsin increased the utility of cohabitation 
compared with other options for at least part of the population.  
The change brought community property law into the public eye. The 
publicity brought the differences in the two law regimes to the forefront of the 
minds of the Wisconsinites. More than in any of the other community property 
states, individuals were conscious of how the law would affect the outcomes of 
the decisions they made. This could have affected the decisions of the 
individuals in Wisconsin. The expectations formed through the media coverage of 
the law could have caused the law to have a different effect on the individual 
decisions made by the population in Wisconsin than it does in other states.  
The impact of the adoption of the community property law on the 
cohabitation rate exceeded the change of the cohabitation rate in the states 
where the states whose property laws remained static. 
Many laws are brought in front of the public without the careful 
considerations of the impact that the law could have on other aspects of daily 
living. If Wisconsin had known that the adoption of the community property law 
would lead to a greater increase in cohabitation rates than other states 
experienced possibly decreasing the importance of marriage in their state, the 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3 Mean Percentage of Key Variables 
Variables WI Midwest Similar
White 96.1% 94.4% 93.7%
Black 3.2% 4.7% 5.1%
Other 0.8% 0.9% 1.2%
Single never married 21.3% 18.8% 19.3%
Currently cohabiting 2.7% 2.2% 2.6%
Married 69.3% 71.5% 70.4%
Seperated 1.6% 1.6% 1.8%
Divorced living single 5.1% 6.0% 5.9%
Did not finish high school 65.5% 65.7% 60.7%
High school diploma 3.2% 3.4% 3.8%
Some college 16.4% 16.5% 18.5%
Bachelor's 11.0% 10.6% 12.8%
Graduate 3.9% 3.8% 4.3%
Family Income 22199 21054 21946
White 94.5% 93.4% 91.0%
Black 3.6% 4.8% 6.4%
Other 1.9% 1.8% 2.5%
Single never married 19.9% 19.1% 19.3%
Currently cohabiting 5.9% 4.4% 4.5%
Married 65.7% 66.9% 66.5%
Seperated 1.8% 1.7% 1.9%
Divorced living single 6.7% 7.8% 7.9%
Did not finish high school 33.4% 33.8% 31.1%
High school diploma 24.7% 24.3% 22.2%
Some college 22.8% 23.6% 24.7%
Bachelor's 13.3% 12.8% 15.5%
Graduate 5.8% 5.5% 6.6%






1. Means prior to  1988
1. Means for 1988 and after
Income




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5 Results of the Five Nested Models 
  
Variables {A} {B} {C} {D} {E}
Constant 0.0259 -0.0912 0.1225 -0.1573 -0.3256
(0.000) (0.029) (0.229) (0.213) (0.020)
Wisconsin 0.0014 0.0037 0.0035 0.0056 0.0028
(0.659) (0.181) (0.185) (0.034) (0.307)
Post 1988 0.0190 0.0065 0.0036 0.0033 0.0016
(0.000) (0.046) (0.259) (0.288) (0.618)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0127 0.0127 0.0133 0.0147 0.0144
(0.062) (0.029) (0.024) (0.007) (0.012)
Constant 0.0296 -0.0863 0.2324 -0.0332 -0.2198
(0.000) (0.153) (0.126) (0.569) (0.212)
Wisconsin 0.0032 0.0060 0.0054 0.0083 0.0071
(0.467) (0.070) (0.090) (0.022) (0.076)
Post 1988 0.0115 0.0054 0.0023 0.0033 0.0007
(0.000) (0.170) (0.556) (0.507) (0.853)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0144 0.0161 0.0176 0.0177 0.0166
(0.064) (0.016) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.0205 -0.0077 0.3504 0.3013 0.1780
(0.000) (0.846) (0.004) (0.058) (0.238)
Wisconsin 0.0056 0.0049 0.0055 0.0058 0.0043
(0.034) (0.039) (0.014) (0.009) (0.026)
Post 1988 0.0218 0.0094 0.0081 0.0058 0.0068
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0111 0.0082 0.0075 0.0094 0.0102
(0.065) (0.128) (0.181) (0.068) (0.066)
Constant 0.0234 -0.0548 0.3667 0.4760 0.2612
(0.000) (0.242) (0.008) (0.005) (0.121)
Wisconsin 0.0062 0.0057 0.0062 0.0071 0.0033
(0.012) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.160)
Post 1988 0.0164 0.0081 0.0074 0.0061 0.0063
(0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0138 0.0123 0.0120 0.0127 0.0149
(0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.024) (0.008)
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes




Midwestern states over 15 years
Midwestern states over 20 years
Similar states over 15 years
Similar states over 20 years
Control Variables Included
Note: P-Values are shown in parenthesis are from a robust regression the takes into 






Table 3.6 Full Results of the Five Nested Models for the Regressions on the 
Midwestern States for the 20 Years from 1977 to 1997 
 
  
Variables {A} {B} {C} {D} {E}
Constant 0.0205 -0.0077 0.3504 0.3013 0.1780
(0.000) (0.846) (0.004) (0.058) (0.238)
Wisconsin 0.0056 0.0049 0.0055 0.0058 0.0043
(0.034) (0.039) (0.014) (0.009) (0.026)
Post 1988 0.0218 0.0094 0.0081 0.0058 0.0068
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0111 0.0082 0.0075 0.0094 0.0102
(0.065) (0.128) (0.181) (0.068) (0.066)
60s -0.0843 -0.0295 0.0235 -0.0096
(0.258) (0.717) (0.764) (0.905)
50s -0.0854 -0.0290 -0.0308 0.0507
(0.185) (0.682) (0.679) (0.464)
40s 0.2047 0.1937 0.1263 0.0887
(0.002) (0.004) (0.061) (0.157)
30s 0.1016 0.0941 0.1153 0.0484
(0.100) (0.192) (0.089) (0.486)
20s 0.0258 0.0331 0.0656 0.0473
(0.615) (0.530) (0.179) (0.325)
Under 20 -0.3017 -0.2970 -0.2400 -0.1968
(0.086) (0.097) (0.199) (0.252)
White -0.3733 -0.3387 -0.3520
(0.000) (0.018) (0.010)
Black -0.4041 -0.3669 -0.3983
(0.000) (0.016) (0.006)
High school grad 0.0192 0.0224
(0.099) (0.042)
Some College 0.0644 0.0141
(0.061) (0.685)
Bachelor's Degree -0.0372 -0.0119
(0.599) (0.859)




P-value is shown in parenthesis. Results are heteroskidastically robust. 






Table 3.7 Full Results of the Five Nested Models for the Regressions on the 
Midwestern States for the 15 Years from 1980 to 1995 
 
  
Variables {A} {B} {C} {D} {E}
Constant 0.0234 -0.0548 0.3667 0.4760 0.2612
(0.000) (0.242) (0.008) (0.005) (0.121)
Wisconsin 0.0062 0.0057 0.0062 0.0071 0.0033
(0.012) (0.009) (0.003) (0.001) (0.160)
Post 1988 0.0164 0.0081 0.0074 0.0061 0.0063
(0.000) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0138 0.0123 0.0120 0.0127 0.0149
(0.052) (0.037) (0.053) (0.024) (0.008)
60s -0.0480 -0.0211 0.0118 -0.0486
(0.603) (0.817) (0.897) (0.620)
50s -0.0192 0.0377 0.0134 -0.0446
(0.794) (0.634) (0.864) (0.576)
40s 0.2541 0.2141 0.1272 0.0724
(0.001) (0.007) (0.083) (0.334)
30s 0.1439 0.1060 0.1085 0.0643
(0.055) (0.201) (0.177) (0.421)
20s 0.0799 0.0832 0.0851 0.0389
(0.174) (0.154) (0.123) (0.493)
Under 20 -0.0592 -0.0915 -0.0761 -0.0091
(0.770) (0.657) (0.724) (0.966)
White -0.4216 -0.5147 -0.4629
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Black -0.4416 -0.5294 -0.4908
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
High school grad 0.0294 0.0286
(0.016) (0.016)
Some College -0.0121 -0.0406
(0.731) (0.266)
Bachelor's Degree -0.0042 -0.0249
(0.955) (0.742)




P-value is shown in parenthesis. Results are heteroskidastically robust. 






Table 3.8 Full Results of the Five Nested Models for the Regressions on the 
Demographically Similar States for the 20 Years from 1977 to 1997 
 
  
Variables {A} {B} {C} {D} {E}
Constant 0.0259 -0.0912 0.1225 -0.1573 -0.3256
(0.000) (0.029) (0.229) (0.213) (0.020)
Wisconsin 0.0014 0.0037 0.0035 0.0056 0.0028
(0.659) (0.181) (0.185) (0.034) (0.307)
Post 1988 0.0190 0.0065 0.0036 0.0033 0.0016
(0.000) (0.046) (0.259) (0.288) (0.618)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0127 0.0127 0.0133 0.0147 0.0144
(0.062) (0.029) (0.024) (0.007) (0.012)
60s 0.0244 0.1229 0.0930 0.0942
(0.782) (0.124) (0.210) (0.207)
50s -0.0650 -0.0130 -0.0913 -0.0008
(0.435) (0.869) (0.249) (0.992)
40s 0.3633 0.3959 0.2082 0.2012
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
30s 0.1587 0.1663 0.1229 0.1059
(0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.026)
20s 0.2051 0.2096 0.2031 0.2458
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Under 20 -0.3120 -0.3037 -0.0561 -0.0087
(0.012) (0.008) (0.632) (0.941)
White -0.2396 0.0463 0.0050
(0.012) (0.702) (0.967)
Black -0.2893 0.0226 -0.0278
(0.002) (0.851) (0.818)
High school grad 0.0289 0.0290
(0.092) (0.083)
Some College 0.0597 0.0339
(0.133) (0.366)
Bachelor's Degree 0.1572 0.0822
(0.010) (0.177)




P-value is shown in parenthesis. Results are heteroskidastically robust. 






Table 3.9 Full Results of the Five Nested Models for the Regressions on the 
Demographically Similar States for the 15 Years from 1980 to 1995 
 
Variables {A} {B} {C} {D} {E}
Constant 0.0296 -0.0863 0.2324 -0.0332 -0.2198
(0.000) (0.153) (0.126) (0.569) (0.212)
Wisconsin 0.0032 0.0060 0.0054 0.0083 0.0071
(0.467) (0.070) (0.090) (0.022) (0.076)
Post 1988 0.0115 0.0054 0.0023 0.0033 0.0007
(0.000) (0.170) (0.556) (0.507) (0.853)
Wisconsin x Post 1988 0.0144 0.0161 0.0176 0.0177 0.0166
(0.064) (0.016) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002)
60s 0.0237 0.1200 0.0472 -0.0042
(0.922) (0.307) (0.492) (0.660)
50s -0.1543 -0.0553 -0.1378 -0.1188
(0.194) (0.433) (0.112) (0.158)
40s 0.3052 0.3392 0.1538 0.1347
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.024)
30s 0.1947 0.1925 0.1551 0.1117
(0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.023)
20s 0.2053 0.2044 0.2089 0.2176
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Under 20 -0.1436 -0.0718 0.1911 0.2053
(0.140) (0.219) (0.377) (0.246)
White -0.3513 -0.0752 -0.0839
(0.005) (0.920) (0.865)
Black -0.3937 -0.0925 -0.1058
(0.001) (0.785) (0.721)
High school grad 0.0377 0.0347
(0.036) (0.047)
Some College 0.0386 0.0393
(0.841) (0.867)
Bachelor's Degree 0.1519 0.0998
(0.053) (0.187)




P-value is shown in parenthesis. Results are heteroskidastically robust. 












4.1 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 addressed the impact that community property law has on 
cohabitation rates. In 1977 there was a large impact. Individuals in community 
property states in 1977 were 68% more likely to cohabitate than their common 
law counterparts (see Figure 2.1). However, over the years the likelihood to 
cohabitate has equalized in the two different regimes. In 2010 there was no 
significant difference between the two regimes. The difference dropped by an 
average of 1.2% each year until finally converging in the last few years.  
In the late 1960s through the entire decade of the 1970s many individuals 
deviated from the societal norm by divorcing in greater numbers than previously 
seen. This increase in deviation from the norm paved the way for the next 
generation to further diminish the importance of the marital code of behavior. The 
loss of reputation caused by cohabitation may have dropped to little or no effect 
for this next generation. This drop may be one of the driving factors for the 
convergence of cohabitation rates by the two regimes. During this same time the 
courts in common law regimes increased the use of the fairness guidelines. This 





consistency to the outcomes causing it to more closely resemble community 
property law and the equal division of property in divorce. This increased equality 
in common law states could be another factor in the convergence of the 
cohabitation rates of the two regimes. Finally the increase in female labor force 
participation along with the decreasing discrepancy between male and female 
wages could also have been playing a role in the convergence in the cohabitation 
rates. With the contributions from both husband and wife becoming closer to 
equal the issues of perceived unfairness of equal division upon divorce in 
community property states may have lessened, decreasing the impact that 
community property law has on the cohabitation rates and allowing the 
convergence of the cohabitation rates.  
The convergence of the two regimes brings up the question of whether  
cohabitation correlations are changing over time as well. Next steps would be to 
ask if the correlation between premarital cohabitation and marital stability still 
holds within the most recent generation. Are the dynamics for household 
formation changing? Or could that correlation be strengthening because only 
those that believe and live by the marital code of behavior will wait to live 
together until after a formal marriage? Those that believe that death is the only 
thing that will separate them and marriage is the only thing that brings them 
under the same roof will continue to avoid cohabitation despite the lessened 
impact that cohabitation has on their reputation.  
One extension of the analysis put forth in chapter two is to examine other 






4.2 Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 was designed to further at look the correlation between 
community property law and the cohabitation rates. The adoption of community 
property law by Wisconsin provided an ideal way to scrutinize the impact that the 
law has had on cohabitation. Comparison states were identified by looking for 
states that were demographically similar to Wisconsin prior to 1988. Comparing 
these states with Wisconsin, we are able to conclude that the adoption of the law 
did have a positive impact on the cohabitation rates. The increase in the 
cohabitation rate for Wisconsin was 50% greater than the increase for the 
comparison states. This conclusion further supports the results of Chapter 2. 
The Wisconsin experiment could have been strengthened by looking for a 
similar trend in other data sets. The use of percentages of the adult population in 
the main variable as well as the control variable introduced heteroskedasticity 
into the results. While using a heteroskedasticly robust model to eliminate the 
bias that the heteroskedasticity may have caused, the results may also be 
strengthened by using an econometric model that would not require the use of 
percentages.  
 
4.3 Further Research 
While this research answers a few questions it brings up a few more 
questions. For example, what impact does this law have on other household 





supply, or the age at first marriage, or the amount of time between divorce and 
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